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Abstract
We analyse the problem of contradictory information distribution in networks of
agents with positive and negative trust. The networks of interest are built by ranked
agents with different epistemic attitudes. In this context, positive trust is a property of
the communication between agents required when message passing is executed
bottom-up in the hierarchy, or as a result of a sceptic agent checking information.
These two situations are associated with a confirmation procedure that has an
epistemic cost. Negative trust results from refusing verification, either of contradictory
information or because of a lazy attitude. We offer first a natural deduction system
called SecureNDsim to model these interactions and consider some meta-theoretical
properties of its derivations. We then implement it in a NetLogo simulation to test
experimentally its formal properties. Our analysis concerns in particular: conditions for
consensus-reaching transmissions; epistemic costs induced by confirmation and
rejection operations; the influence of ranking of the initially labelled nodes on
consensus and costs; complexity results.
Keywords: Trust, Distrust, Contradictory information, Agent-based simulation
Introduction
Trusted information is an essential feature of computational contexts where agents might
have to rely on external sources to execute decisions effectively and securely. With
increasingly large networks, trust becomes a method to acquire information that would
otherwise be unavailable or that is effectively hard to produce. Similarly, trust applies in
contexts where a hierarchical structure is in place, defined for example by privileges in
an access control model: here trust can be either a property of top-down communica-
tions, where information is not required to be confirmed; or the result of confirmation
procedures in bottom-up transfers.
Besides network size and structure, another important factor that influences the result
of trusted information sharing processes is the attitude of the network’s nodes, when these
are understood as epistemic agents. Sceptic agents can be characterised by a requirement
to check information; lazy ones by an attitude to reject it. This is of even greater relevance
where contradictory information is allowed, e.g. in the context of opinion diffusion, belief
propagation and its extreme cases, like fake news.
Hence, understanding conditions of information propagation and the costs related to
topological and epistemic factors is crucial for dynamic (social) network analysis and
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access control models, with applications in mathematics, computer science, economics
and biology, but also in concrete, less formal scenarios, e.g. (van de Bunt et al. 2005).
An efficient model of trust propagation highly depends, therefore, on the epistemic and
structural features of the network in which trust is defined. Algorithmic models for effi-
cient knowledge distribution based on trust relations are being investigated both formally
and through applications. Despite the increasing literature, two important aspects have
received little attention so far:
1. in contexts with contradictory information like social networks or insecure access
control systems, understanding how positive and negative trust help or hinder the
data flow;
2. the epistemic costs of (negative) trust transitivity.
In this paper we offer both a formal model and a computational simulation combining
the above mentioned properties. The networks of interest are built by ranked agents, as
they could occur in standard access control models. They are, moreover, defined in terms
of an epistemic attitude:
• sceptic agents pay an epistemic cost for performing a checking operation before
trusting the received information;
• lazy agents accept without checking information consistent with their current
knowledge, while they distrust inconsistent messages.
In this context, positive trust is a property of the communication between agents
required when message passing is executed bottom-up in the hierarchy, or as a result
of a sceptic agent checking information. Negative trust is instead the result of rejecting
received contradictory information. These two situations are associated with epistemic
costs, essential to determine if a network that resolves contradictory transmissions by
rejecting information is more or less costly than one which facilitates message passing by
straightforward acceptance. We focus in particular on networks that preserve memory of
previously obtained trusted communications.
First, we model the problem formally through a natural deduction system called
SecureNDsim, presenting rules that offer a proof-theoretical semantics for the behaviour
of the agents. We formulate some meta-theoretical properties of its derivations, concern-
ing in particular:
1. the computation of the trust value in a given derivation;
2. the resolution of derivations with contradictory information;
3. the convergence between valid formulae, order on agents and the application of
specific rules.
The logic is an extension of the calculus for trust developed in (Primiero and
Raimondi 2014) and extended in (Primiero 2016) with the semantics for negative trust
from (Primiero and Kosolosky 2016). The calculus has been applied to problems in
software management in (Boender et al. 2015a).
Second, we offer a NetLogo simulation that implements the algorithms underlying the
calculus, maps formal derivations in various graphs and allows to test experimentally the
formal properties. In our analysis we consider in particular:
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1. changes in the final distribution of contradictory information in view of network
topology;
2. changes in the final distribution of contradictory information in view of ranking
and epistemic role of seeding agents;
3. the quantification of the epistemic costs for trust and distrust operations.
The experimental analysis offered here extends the initial results presented in (Primiero
et al. 2017).
The paper is organised as follows. In “Related work” section we overview the related
work, both formal and experimental. In “The logic (un)SecureNDsim” section we
introduce the calculus SecureNDsim and provide the meta-theoretical results. In
“Design and implementation” section we introduce the principles underlying the
graph construction and analyse the algorithms at the basis of the simulation. In
“Experimental results” section we describe our experimental results on consensus, rank-
ings, costs and complexity. Finally, “Conclusions” section presents general observations
on our analysis and future work.
Related work
Our work is at the confluence of several different research areas. We focus in particular
on the role of trust in computational environments and the several approaches to its prop-
agation. In relation to contradictory information, we overview the distinction between
controversial users vs. controversial trust values. In qualifying our own semantic notion of
trust, we report on models using binary and continuous trust values. Finally, we consider
how local vs. global trust methods differ.
The first research area of interest concerns the treatment of computational trust
for models of access control and network analysis. This area includes several logical
model and algorithmic treatments, with an eye on applications and it spans several dis-
ciplines, including logics, cryptography, network theory, security protocols. Since the
Bell-LaPadula Model in access control theory (Bell and LaPadula 1973), trust is intended
as a property of agents, as opposed to security as a property of the system: trusted subjects
are allowed to violate security constraints and trustworthiness of resources corresponds
to prevention of unauthorised change. Inmore recent resource-based access control mod-
els, trustworthiness is either defined by temporal-spatial constraints (Chandran and Joshi
2005), or by user-defined constraints (Chakraborty and Ray 2006; Oleshchuk 2012). In
authentication logics, trust is coupled to beliefs with application to distributed settings
(Barker and Genovese 2011).
Trust propagation, interference and distrust blocking in uncertain environments and
autonomous systems are receiving increasing attention (Carbone et al. 2003; Guha et al.
2004; Ziegler and Lausen 2005; Marsh and Dibben 2005; Jøsang and Pope 2005), with
applications to internet-based services (Grandison and Sloman 2000), component-based
(Yan and Prehofer 2011) and software management systems for security and reputation
(Bugiel et al. 2011), or accuracy (Ali et al. 2013). A costs-efficient analysis in terms of
modal logic is to be found in (Anderson et al. 2013). In the context of propagation, tran-
sitivity is a natural property to study. The problem of trust transitivity has received much
attention, see (Christianson and Harbison 1997; Jøsang and Pope 2005) for an older and
a more recent approach. An analysis for trusted communications in terms of dependent
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types is given in (Primiero and Taddeo 2012). In (Primiero and Raimondi 2014), trust
is defined proof-theoretically as a function on resources rather than a relation between
agents: this allows transitivity of writing privileges only under satisfaction of a consis-
tency constraint. The calculus introduced in “The logic (un)SecureNDsim” section is an
extension thereof. Unfortunately, none of these previous logic-based approaches consider
either the case of contradictory information, nor the aspects of epistemic costs associ-
ated with such a scenario. This task is the aim of the translation of logical principles in
an experimental analysis, presented in “Design and implementation” section. Transitivity
of trust is also analysed in the context of cryptographic applications, see e.g. (Maurer and
Schmid 1996).
A related area of analysis is that of belief diffusion, especially in social networks. Con-
tinuous models assume a continuous numerical value on agents’ opinions, with updates
depending on weights (Lehrer andWagner 1981), where the latter can also vary over time
(Chatterjee and Seneta 1977) or where influence is admitted only below a certain distance
(Hegselmann and Krause 2002). A model that combines opinion diffusion with influenc-
ing power is presented in (Grandi et al. 2015). Another aspect of information diffusion in
social networks which is gaining much attention is related to the propagation of misin-
formation or ‘fake news’, the resulting polarisation of communities and the possibility of
cascades, see e.g. (del Vicario et al. 2016). Our model combines the comparative ranking
value of agents with both their distinct epistemic attitudes and a majority selection in the
case of conflicting information, which we take to indicate the presence of both a correct
and an incorrect interpretation of facts.
In (Massa and Avesani 2005) controversial users are those generating a disagreement on
their trustworthiness, either as the minimum between trust and distrust evaluations by
other users, or as the difference in the number of trust and distrust judgements. The work
in (Zicari et al. 2016) considers, instead, controversial trust values between two nodes,
determined either as the trust weight of their edge, or as a fixed negative value when no
path exists, or as a continuous value t ∈[ 0, 1] when there is no direct edge. Similarly,
in our logic trust is a function on formulas obtained by verification, encoded in the net-
work model by a property of edges when a node is labelled. Differently from the above,
our model uses discrete values but it combines the comparative ranking of agents with
both their epistemic attitudes and a majority selection in the case of conflicting infor-
mation. The approach in (Massa and Avesani 2005) also uses a binary classification for
users, so do several models for belief diffusion in social networks, with binary opinions
for agents, considering neighbours’ influence (Granovetter 1978; Kempe et al. 2005) or
majority (Raghavan et al. 2007). Trust defined by global methods is a value attached to a
user and appropriate for a reputation evaluation at network level; in local methods, trust
is inferred instead as a value between source and sink nodes, i.e., it is a feature of an edge.
As it appears clearly from the above, our approach uses a local trust method in the case
of non-conflicting information, resorting to a computation of trust using path lengths
to determine which elements need to be distrusted in the case of conflicting informa-
tion. This combination of features recalls the two controversial cases discussed in (Zicari
et al. 2016): the ToTrustOrNotToTrust case resembles our binary choice, but moderated
by continuous trust values, while we rely on ranking and epistemic attitudes; the Asym-
metric Controversy case resorts to path lengths with preference for shortest paths, while
we base our result on the number of distrustful edges present in each path.
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The modelling and computer simulation of trust and its management for large (social)
networks sharing data are also becoming widespread across various scientific communi-
ties. The exposure of users in social networks to ideologically diverse contents is a recent
object of study in networks theories, see (Bakshy et al. 2015), in particular to qualify the
assumption that such networks facilitate the creation of filter bubbles and echo chambers.
Another example is given by the (standard and digital) scientific networks, which count
trustworthiness as a parameter to select citations and co-authorship (Quattrociocchi
et al. 2012). Accordingly, the role of trust in these types of networks is receiving much
attention in academia, industry and policy-making. An overview of this research area with
a focus on trust evolution is available from (Netrvalová 2006). Another extensive litera-
ture review of computational modelling of trust with a focus on evolutionary games and
social networks is given in (Mui 2002). The role of trust in virtual societies is also analysed
in (Coelho 2002) and (Corritore et al. 2003). A more recent analysis for social relations
is provided in (Sutcliffe and Wang 2012). In (Iyer and Thuraisingham 2007) a Java sim-
ulation for trust negotiation and confidentiality between agents with common goals and
only partial information is introduced. Transaction costs economics in inter-groups rela-
tions has been extended in view of trust in (Nooteboom et al. 2000): here agents attach a
metric on trust relative to potential profit. Joint work in teams is also analysed in terms of
trust to quantify performance at the individual and team level in (Martínez-Miranda and
Pavón 2009).
As far as we are aware, none of the previous works combines a rule-based semantics
with an experimental analysis. Moreover, the combination of characteristics of the model
we analyse and simulate seem to have been ignored so far. These include: a characteri-
sation of agents as sceptic or lazy towards epistemic contents; their structural ranking,
typical of access control systems; the quantification of epistemic costs of trust and
distrust; and the conditions for consensus in the presence of contradictory information.
The logic (un)SecureNDsim
In this section we introduce the logic (un)SecureNDsim, a natural deduction calcu-
lus whose rules define how agents can execute access operations on (atomic) formulas
and their negations. The proof-theoretic setting of the language has several advantages.
First, it allows us to clearly express the algorithmic protocol introduced in “Design
and implementation” section through pairs of rules that fully describe the semantics
of each operation available to agents. Second, it provides the means to explore meta-
theoretical properties of the model which the simulation cannot offer. Finally, it lays down
preparatory work for the possible formal verification of the protocol.
Agents of the language are epistemically characterised and their different access priv-
ileges on contents are reflected in an order relation. We distinguish two types of agents
who behave differently in the context of information transmission:
• sceptic agents: they pay an epistemic cost by performing a checking operation before
trusting received information;
• lazy agent : they distrust the information when this is not consistent with their
current knowledge.
Obviously, this distinction does not cover the whole spectrum of possible epistemic
attitudes towards information received and it could be offered in a graded scale. We
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limit ourselves here to these two basic cases. While the logic is rigid with respect to
how these attitudes are executed, in the simulation model developed in “Design and
implementation” section, we allow for slight changes of behaviour, i.e. where we establish
that only a certain fraction of sceptic agents check information.
Agents’ operations are those typical of access control models, namely reading and writ-
ing, where the former is here understood as message receiving, and the latter as message
passing. They are further enhanced formally by the following operations:
• verification: it is required either by a top-down reading operation, i.e., when message
passing is executed from below in the hierarchy; or by a reading operation performed
by a sceptic agent;
• falsification: it is formulated as closure of verification under negation and it follows
from reading contents that are inconsistent with the current knowledge of the
receiver; or from a reading operation performed by a lazy agent;
• trust : is a function that follows from verification, when the content passed is
consistent with the knowledge of the receiver;
• distrust : it is formulated as closure of trust under negation and it follows from
falsification.
It is important to stress that, according to this operational semantics, agents do verify
or falsify information on the basis of a contextual evaluation. Agents are here presented
in a contextually empty process of information transmission and their evaluation is purely
based on the evaluation of trustfulness and distrustfulness on the basis of criteria of
majority and origin. In this sense, our logic, the algorithm and the simulation focus on
the role of trust and distrust as independent from truthfulness criteria, while consistency
requirements are crucial. In other words, we do not establish beforehand which of two
contradictory atoms of information is true.
In line with a proof-theoretical approach, we define rules that allow to introduce a
given function from premises, and one to eliminate it, i.e., to obtain a conclusion without
such function. Such a pair of rules defines syntactically the meaning of access operations,
including verification, trust and their negations. (un)SecureNDsim is here introduced as
a stand-alone formal system, but it can be seen as a para-complete fragment of the logic
SecureND presented in (Primiero and Raimondi 2014). This logic has been specifically
designed to resolve situations of unintended (and therefore possibly risky) trust
transitivity of the form:
Alice trusts Bob and Bob trusts Carol; therefore Alice trusts Carol.
In (Boender et al. 2015b), the logic is formally verified through translation to a Coq pro-
tocol and applied to a problem of trust transitivity in software management. In (Primiero
2016), the calculus is further extended with negation to define the logic (un)SecureND,
which includes two negative trust protocols: one for misplacement of trust (mistrust),
on for betrayal (distrust). (un)SecureNDsim models the latter in the context of message
passing in a network of ordered agents with contradictory information. The extension
to a verification protocol is a new property added to this family of logics by the present
fragment.
We first introduce the syntax of the system and the main properties of the underlying
access control model. We further illustrate in some details the rules and some minimal
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meta-theoretical properties of the related derivability relation. Finally we illustrate some
structural properties of (un)SecureNDsim derivations concerning especially validity and
the role of trust instances in the length of such derivations. These formal properties are
later experimentally tested in “Experimental results” section.
Formal preliminaries
Definition 1 The syntax of (un)SecureNDsim is defined by the following alphabet:
V< := {lazy(vi),sceptic(vi)}
φV := pvi | ¬φV | Read (φV ) | Verify (φV ) | Write (φV ) | Trust (φV )
V := {φvi1 , . . . ,φvin };
V< indicates the set of lazy and sceptic agents, each denoted by vi, vj, . . . . The apex
works as a formal reminder that agents are ordered according to an order relation <. The
order relation< overV×V models the dominance relation between agents: vi < vj means
that agent vi has higher relevance (e.g., in terms of security privileges) than agent vj. φV
is a meta-variable for boolean atomic formulae closed under negation and functions for
reading, writing, verification and trust. It should be stressed that the current formalmodel
and the subsequent algorithmic model refer to atomic information for simplicity, but the
complexity of the formula representing the transmitted information is entirely irrelevant
for our results. We use vi to express a set of formulae typed by one agent vi ∈ V , typically
the sender, in which a given formula φV is derivable. vi is called the context in which φvi
is derived. We denote an empty context by · .
Definition 2 (Judgement) A judgement vi  φvj states that a formula φ is valid for
agent vj in the context  of formulas (including operations) of agent vi.
Our judgements express thus some operation that the agent on the left-hand side
of the derivability sign performs on information typed the agent on the right-hand side
of the same sign. When message passing includes more than one agent, this is encoded
in the system by an extension of the context, denoted as vi ;vj . A judgement stating
the validity of a formula for one agent under a (possibly extended) context of formulas of
(an)other agent(s) matches the procedure Transmission introduced below in “Design
and implementation” section to extend a given graph G with a newly labelled vertex.
Assuming vi < vj, valid privilege transfers for access control in our system are
summarised as follows by judgements of (un)SecureNDsim:
• vj  Read(φvi): reading is always allowed when messages come from up in the order
relation; this is not always the case in access control models, where one might
establish reading privileges to hold only upwards, e.g. in the case where strict security
is applied; we model a less strict scenario, where agents can always read information
that is passed top-down.
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• If vi  Read(φvj) then vi  Verify(φvj): messages coming upwards from below in
the order relation are passed on under a verification function.
• If sceptic(vj), and vj  Read(φvi), then vj  Verify(φvi): we further wish to
enhance the structure of the model by requiring that the message passing is qualified
by verification in one additional case: not only because the transmission is executed
upwards in the dominance relation, but also because a sceptic agent is on the
receiving side and it verifies the information.
• If lazy(vj), and vj  Read(φvi), then vj  ¬Verify(φvi): when a lazy agent is on
the receiving side, information is not verified.
• If vi  Read(φvj) and vi  ¬φ, then vi  ¬Verify(φvj): when a content read from
below contradicts current knowledge, refutation is modelled as negation of
verification.
Notice that in the last two cases refuted verification leads to negated trust. The rule
system (un)SecureNDsim modelling these cases is introduced in Fig. 1 and it assumes
that vi < vj holds. The first rules are for inductive construction of a context vi . Any
such context, also called user profile, is required to be consistent (i.e., it admits only one
of φ and ¬φ) after a message passing operation is concluded. We use a standard context-
extension syntax vi ;φvj to indicate that the extension of the profile for agent vi with a
formula φ from agent vj preserves consistency. Extensions that do not preserve consis-
tency are not allowed. The rule read_down establishes that if a message is owned by a
user vi it can be read downwards (this is the first of the above privilege transfers). The rule
read_elim is the corresponding elimination rule: a message that is read (first premise) and
preserves consistency (second premise) can be owned, expressed by the change of label
in the formula φ. We now consider the case of access from upwards in the dominance
relation. The rule verify_high says that if a message owned by an agent vj is read from
another agent vi higher in the dominance relation, then a verification action is required.
Similarly, by rule verify_sceptic a verification procedure is called when the receiver is
sceptic (independently from the order, hence also when the receiver is below). The rule
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Fig. 1 The system (un)SecureNDsim
trust is the elimination rule for the verification procedure: if verify is called and the mes-
sage preserves consistency (i.e., is derivable in the current agent’s profile), then the link
between the agents about that message is trusted. Trust elimination corresponds to mes-
sage passing according to write_trust. The current simple setting of (un)SecureNDsim
models information rejection through a consistency checking rule: every message pass-
ing operation is eventually accepted if consistent. Verification, and accordingly Trust, are
not implemented in two cases: by rule unverified_contrawhen messages received conflict
with currently held contents; and by rule unverified_lazy when when a lazy agent is on
the receiving side. Resolution of two received contents inconsistent with one another are
resolved below through an additional definition based on popularity (see Definition 5).
Missing verification implies distrust, and this in turn passing the opposite message by
distrust_elim.
Example 1 A simple derivation of message passing (assuming vi < vj):
This derivation illustrates a message φ written by agent vj, read by agent vi, verified and
written to be passed further on. This standard case holds also if vi ∈ sceptic_node
(even assuming vj < vi); if vi ∈ lazy_node, then the verification passage is skipped to
infer write directly.
Primiero et al. Applied Network Science  (2017) 2:12 Page 10 of 30
Proposition 1 Any successful (un)SecureNDsim message-passing operation is a deriva-
tion tree including a Write− Read− (Verify− Trust) − Write series of sequents.
Standard logical notions can be formulated as follows:
Definition 3 (Satisfiability) An (un)SecureNDsim judgement vi  φvi is satisfied if
there is a derivation D and a branch D′ ⊆ D with a final step terminating with such a
judgement.
Definition 4 (Validity) An (un)SecureNDsim judgement V  φV is valid if there is a
derivation D and for all branches D′ ⊆ D and for all agents vi ∈ V, there is a final step
terminating with such a judgement.
Structural properties on derivations
By Proposition 1, verification and trust are optional steps in a derivation if the message
is received by a lazy agent. This suggests that each derivation (or branch thereof) can be
analysed in view of its length to count the number of trust rule instances occurring in it.1
This allows us to identify the number of times an atomic message φ has been trusted in a
given derivation D. We denote such measure by |Trust(φV ) |D.
Theorem 1 |Trust(φV ) |D=|Verify(φV ) |D, for all vi ∈ V.
Proof By induction on the length of D, provided that verify_high and verify_sceptic are
the only rules that introduce a formulaVerify(φvi)which is the premise of a trust rule.
This computable method allows us to offer a simple resolution for the case in which
consistency fails and one wants to decide on the basis of the more trusted formula on the
derivation tree.
Definition 5 (Conflict Resolution by TrustMajority)Given a derivation D1 terminating
in vi  Write(φvi) and a derivation D2 terminating in vj  Write(¬φvj), a new step
holds which takes as premises k  Read(φvi) and k  Read(¬φvj) respectively, and
concludes vk  φvk if and only if |Trust(φV ) |D1>|Trust(¬φV ) |D2 .
This suggests that at any stage of branch merging, the most popular (trusted) content is
preserved, hence enforcing a network effect.
A different resolution strategy can be enforced by computing the number of times an
atomic message φ has been distrusted in a given derivation D. We denote such measure
by |DisTrust(φV ) |D.
Theorem 2 |DisTrust(φV ) |D=|¬Verify(φV ) |D, for all vi ∈ V.
Proof By induction on the length of D, provided that unverified_contra and
unverified_lazy are the only rules that introduce a formula ¬Verify(φvi) which is the
premise of a distrust rule.
Definition 6 (Conflict Resolution by Distrust Majority) Given a derivation D1
terminating in vi  Write(φvi) and a derivation D2 terminating in vj  Write(¬φvj), a
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new step holds which takes as premises k  Read(φvi) and k  Read(¬φvj) respectively,
and concludes vk  φvk if and only if |DisTrust(φV ) |D1<|DisTrust(¬φV ) |D2 .
From Definition 4, the following holds:
Lemma 1 For each (un)SecureNDsim derivation D with a valid formula V  φV ,
there is a graph G that is unanimously labelled by φ.
Proof The proof requires to construct a graph G with a node for each distinct vi ∈ V
occurring in D and an edge for each judgement instantiating one or more rules with two
distinct nodes on each side of the derivability sign. Starting from the node occurring at
the highest position ofD validating φ, by application of one ormore sequences of rules the
conclusion in such branch ofD represents a new node inG labelled by φ. If all branches of
D terminate with a formula validating φ, as by assumption and according to Definition 4,
then all nodes in G will be labelled by φ.
The construction of such a graph G for experimental purposes is the aim of “Related
work” section. Notice, moreover, the following structural properties on SecureNDsim
derivations.
Lemma 2 For a derivation D of (un)SecureNDsim, the value of |Trust(φV ) |D is directly
proportional to the number of verify_high rule applications and the number of distinct
sceptic(vi) ∈ V occurring as labels in the premises of the derivation.
Proof By structural induction on D, selecting the appropriate step as indicated by
Theorem 1.
Lemma 3 For a derivation D of (un)SecureNDsim, the value of | ¬Trust(φV ) |D is
directly proportional to the number of unverified_contra rule applications and the number
of distinct lazy(vi) ∈ V occurring as labels in the premises of the derivation.
Proof By structural induction on D, selecting the appropriate step as indicated by
Theorem 2.
Lemma 4 Given a (un)SecureNDsim derivation D, the formula vi  φvi converges to
validity in D and to full labelling in the corresponding graph G as a direct function of:
• the number of instances of the verify_high rule applications.
• the number of instances of the verify_sceptic rule applications, for each vi ∈ V .
where φvi occurs in the conclusion, and as an inverse function of:
• the number of instances of the unverified_contra rule applications.
• the number of instances of the unverified_lazy rule applications, for each vi ∈ V .
where φvi occurs in the first premise.
Proof This follows directly by Lemmas 2 and 3, and for the graph analysis by Lemma 1;
the more verification operations and the more sceptic agents, the higher the convergence
towards validity; the more distrust operations on the same formula, and the more the lazy
agents, the lower the convergence.
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We offer in the following sections an agent based simulation which implements the set
of rules described in (un)SecureNDsim and proceed with an experimental analysis of its
conditions and results.
Design and implementation
In this section we illustrate the design and implementation of a NetLogomodel (Wilensky
1999) based on (un)SecureNDsim to investigate properties related to knowledge distri-
bution depending on the epistemic attitude of the seeding agents and on the network
topology. NetLogo is a well-known, widely used modelling platform for complex systems
of interacting agents.
We start with basic definitions and analysis of the topologies of interest.
Definition 7 (Graph) A network is an undirected graph G = (V ,E), with a set V =
{vi, . . . , vn} of vertices representing our agents and a set E = {e(i,j), . . . , e(n,m)} of edges,
representing transmissions among them.
Definition 8 (Labelling) Each vertex vi ∈ V can be labelled by formulas as follows:
• vi(p) denotes a vertex labelled by an atomic formulas and expresses an agent i
knowing p;
• vj(¬p) denotes a vertex labelled by the negation of an atomic formula and expresses
agent j knowing ¬p;
• vk() denoted a vertex with no label and expresses an agent k who does not hold any
knowledge yet.
An edge between two labelled nodes is denoted by e(vi(p), vj()) and denotes a transmis-
sion channel from agent i to agent j such that the former can transmit p over to the latter.
The case e(vi(p), vj(¬p)), i.e., where an edge is constructed between two agents hold-
ing contradictory information, is admissible and it requires a resolution procedure. This
is generalised below to the case where one agent who does not hold any knowledge yet
receives contradictory information from two distinct agents. To this aim, a non-standard
notation with three nodes e(vi(p), vj(), vk(¬p)) is used in the following to abbreviate the
presence of two edges e(vi(p), vj()) and e(vk(¬p), vj()) between three nodes, one holding
p, one holding ¬p and one with no information. This is another case where a node with
an empty label requires a resolution procedure to choose between labels p and ¬p.
The order relation ≤ over V × V from the logic (un)SecureNDsim is preserved in
our implementation. Such order becomes total or partial in view of the different possible
topologies of the network: total, linear, random, or scale-free.
• In a total network, each vertex has an edge connecting it to any other vertex and
equal ranking is assigned to all agents; the underlying dominance relation is then a
total order. See Fig. 2a.
• In a linear network, each vertex has an edge to the next vertex higher in the ranking;
by transitivity, this order is also total. See Fig. 2b.
• In a random network, for as long as new nodes are introduced, edges are created
making sure that for each vertex at least one edge with another vertex is established;
the ranking is here assigned by nodes labelled at the beginning (the seeding node) and
never overwritten, the order is partial. See Fig. 3a.
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Fig. 2 a A total network. b A linear network
• Scale-free networks (Milgram 1967; Watts and Strogatz 1998) use the
Barabasi-Albert method to establish edges. Initialised bym = 3 nodes, each node
with 0 neighbours is asked to create an edge with a vertex in the network; for each
new vertex vj without neighbours, vj is connected to up to n < m existing vertices
with a probability p(vj) defined by the following expression:
p(vj) =
kvj∑
vi kvi
where kvj is the number of neighbours of agent vj and the sum is made over all
pre-existing nodes vi. Newly added nodes tend to prefer nodes that already have a
higher number of links. The ranking in this case is given to each node by a simple
function 1|edges| . Scale-free world networks are characterised by the clustering
coefficient with a degree distribution that follows a power-law. See Fig. 3b.
The maximum number of vertices in our graphs is set at 300. The scale-free network
model can be assumed to be representative of real social networks cases: the assumption is
that the degree distribution (as encoded in the network topology) is the main factor to be
investigated by the model. It is known that many global network properties (like resilience
Fig. 3 a A random newtork. b A scale-free network
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to attack, short distance between any pair of nodes etc.) depend on network structure as
defined much more than network size, so it is a reasonable starting point for our model.
As most interesting real-world networks follow the scale-free model, the analysis of real
world networks concerning trust and information spreading can be sufficiently modelled
by this network type.
The randomly seeded contradictory information p,¬p spreads across the network,
according to the algorithm Transmission in Fig. 4: for each edge between a node
labelled by p and one with an empty label, if the latter node is sceptic and in this case if it
is part of a prefixed 95% of the sceptic population, or if its ranking is higher than that of
the sender, then it calls the Verify routine and it is added to the network with the new
label p; notice that here we have implemented a random selection of a 5% of sceptic agents
who do not ask for verification; if the receiver is lazy and it is part of a prefixed 80% of the
lazy population, it calls the Distrust routine and the new node is added with an oppo-
site label; again, we have here set a random 20% of sceptic agents who do not distrust the
information. Hence, the epistemic description of our agents follows the basic distinction
between lazy and sceptic agents introduced in Section “The logic (un)SecureNDsim”. But,
as mentioned above, to offer a more realistic description of our agents and the network
they form, we allow change of attitude. In particular, we allow a very low rate of verifica-
tion cases for lazy agents in networks that have a majority of such agents; and a similar
rate for sceptic agents that might accept information without implementing verification
in networks that have a balanced distribution of lazy and sceptic agents. The rationale
behind this choice is as follows: we assume that in a network with a large majority of
agents with a virtuous behaviour, this is preserved; in a balanced network, we allow a low
number of virtuous agents to slip in their habit; and in a network largely characterised
by the lazy behaviour, we still allow some of the agents to be influenced by the few ones
that have a sceptic attitude. To realise this design, we implement three fixed distributions
of this epistemic attitude across the networks and a semi-random implementation of the
corresponding procedures. Hence, we define three configurations of networks:
1. overly lazy network : in this type of network, the proportion of sceptic nodes is set
at 20%, with their confirmation rate at 5%, the latter expressing the proportion of
such agents that will after all ask for verification;
Fig. 4 Algorithm for simple information transmission
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2. balanced network : in this type of network, the proportion of sceptic nodes is set at
50% and their confirmation rate at 95%, to account for a 5% of random sceptic
agents who decide not to ask for verification after all;
3. overly sceptic network : in this last type of network, the proportion of sceptic nodes
is set at 80%, their confirmation rate at 100%, hence verification is always
implemented.
The sub-routine Verify is illustrated in Fig. 5: its role is to increase the value of costs
associated with the number of trusted links. A successful confirmation procedure estab-
lishes trust as a property characterising edges and it equals to 0 at set up stage. Accepting
information means in turn to create a trusted edge (marked green in the simulation)
and to acquire knowledge of the atom passed. A graph G is relabelled to Trusted(G)
by the procedure Transmission. Notice that passages where the receiver agent is
lazy or lower in the dominance relation do not generate a trusted link.2 The subroutine
Distrust is illustrated in Fig. 6: it increases the value of costs associated with the num-
ber of distrusted links and it labels the receiving node with the atom contrary to the one
received.
When a node labelled by an atom p (by a previous interaction) is linked to another node
labelled by the contradictory ¬p, the routine SolveConflict is started. We offer here
two versions of this resolution strategy.
• The first one, see Fig. 7, takes into account the number of links with nodes labelled by
p, the number of links with nodes labelled by ¬p and sums them to the respective
overall rankings, obtaining values ScoreP and Score¬P. This implementation
sensibly refines the pure majority by counting of the formal system in “The logic
(un)SecureNDsim” section, by adding the ranking of the agents involved as a
parameter of the related score. For each pair of edges from nodes with contradictory
information p,¬p to an unlabelled node, if the value of scoreP is higher than the
value of score¬P, the new node is labelled by p, by ¬p otherwise. We assume here a
context in which agents refer to a popularity criterion in order to choose which of
two contradictory pieces of information to preserve.
• The second version, see Fig. 8, analyses the number of distrusted links appended to
each neighbour with each contradictory piece of information and it selects the new
label from the least distrusted one, proceeding by random choice when an equal
number of distrusted links is detected. We assume here a context in which agents
refer to a popularity criterion in order to choose which of two contradictory pieces of
information not to preserve. It then executes the subroutine Distrust on the
selected link.
Fig. 5 Algorithm for trust costs increase
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Fig. 6 Algorithm for distrust costs increase
The observer-property of trustworthiness (i.e., the total number of trusted links) and
distrustfulness (i.e., the total number of distrusted links) are a known property of the
network at any given time and used to perform conflict resolution. By the procedure
clearP, trusted and distrusted links obtained by a first message passing operation are
preserved in subsequent executions of the procedure Transmission over the same
graph to analyse their effect on epistemic costs. An objective of the experimental analysis
in “Experimental results” section is to compare results of the two resolution sub-routines
to determine the effects of distinct conflict resolution strategies based on trust and
distrust.
Experimental results
Experiments are run over the four distinct types of networks. Scale-free networks better
represent the topology of complex graphs as they occur, for example, in social networks.
On the other hand, linear networks are more common in hierarchical structures that can
be encountered in conditions of access control. The experiments have been executed on
a machine with 7.7 GB of memory running 64bit Ubuntu 15.10. We have collected data
from several scale-free networks of fixed dimensions between 10 and 300 nodes. The
seeding of contradictory information is done by associating an atom p to a lazy node, and
its negation to a sceptic one (although this association can be altered at will). The code
and result of the experiments are available at https://github.com/gprimiero/securendsim.
A first set of experiments has been done on what we call a memoryless network. In
this case, at each successive run of the algorithm the structure of the graph is re-plotted.
As a result, all previous trusted edges are forgotten, meaning that the next information
Fig. 7 Algorithm for conflict resolution by trust majority
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Fig. 8 Algorithm for conflict resolution by distrust majority
distribution is not affected by the previously established links. For this type of net-
works we have run a total of 240 executions of the main algorithm, 30 for each size of
10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, 200, 300 nodes. The following results can be consistently observed:
• The knowledge plot, i.e., the final labelled graph is never consistent with the previous
execution.
• There is no systematic distribution of consensus across the 30 runs.
• There is no systematic relation between the resulting knowledge plot and the costs of
the transmission.
• There is no systematic relation between the knowledge plot and the ranking of the
seeding nodes (nodes labelled at the beginning).
This indicates that memoryless networks do not offer a reliable experimental setting to
investigate issues of consensus and epistemic costs of trusted graphs.
The second set of experiments has been performed again on several networks of differ-
ent size, but ensuring at each run of the main algorithm that the trust graph obtained by
a previous run is preserved. This is obtained by executing at the end of each execution a
procedure clearP, which eliminates all labels from the graph, but preserves ranking and
trusted links. In this way we can better average on the number of trusted and distrusted
links which are created and destroyed at each execution.
Under these experimental conditions, we analyse consensus, costs, ranking of the
seeding nodes and time complexity in networks with trust and distrust.
Consensus
Here and in the following we will call a graph that satisfies consensus a unanimous graph.
Network configuration directly affects consensus results in memory-preserving net-
works with trust only, see Fig. 9a, summarised as follows:
• Total networks reach consensus most often.
• Scale-free networks always perform better than linear or random ones in terms of
number of runs that reach consensus.
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Fig. 9 a Comparison of consensus between networks with trust. b Proportion of timeouts in random
networks
• The data for random networks is not overly reliable, as full labelling might not be
reached (increasingly often in the number of nodes). For this reason, a timeout is set
at 1000 steps. A step indicates here one message passing operation. The proportion
of runs that timeout is given in Fig. 9b, showing a non-strictly linear increase.
Accordingly, the number of runs that reach consensus is bound to decrease.
In particular, for scale-free networks the clustering of lazy nodes is inversely propor-
tional to the construction of trusted edges and in larger networks disadvantageous to
consensus reaching transmissions. Increasing the number of nodes while keeping the
proportion sceptic-lazy constant, means also to increase the probability of clusters
of lazy nodes: this means to reduce the number of trusted edges, in turn progressively
reducing the number of runs in which consensus is obtained. Results for the three con-
figurations (lazy, balanced and sceptic scale-free networks) are plotted in Fig. 10. These
results show that in smaller networks (10 to 30 nodes), clusters of lazy nodes occur rel-
atively often: the results for the three configurations are grouped in a restricted area,
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Fig. 10 Consensus in scale-free networks
between 13 and 23 runs with consensus over 30. In these small networks, the denser
groups of lazy nodes balance the reduced number of trusted links by sceptics. Once net-
work size increases, the positioning of lazy nodes becomes more sparse. This topological
factor crucially influences the number of runs in which consensus is reached: in general,
overly sceptic networks perform better at becoming unanimous graphs. This can also be
interpreted by saying that lazy nodes are less strict in preserving their labelling (i.e., they
denote agents who are more prone to change their minds).
As shown in Fig. 11, networks with trust and distrust present an inverse correlation
between size and the number of transmissions that reach consensus: the smaller the net-
work, the more often full labelling with a unique formula is obtained (i.e., it is easier to
reach consensus). Despite some differences in the reached peaks by lazy and balanced
networks, the behaviour is overall similar in all configurations: balanced networks have
the highest absolute number of such runs, while networks with higher proportion of scep-
tic agents have the lowest number of consensus reaching transmissions. Networks with
distrust significantly differ from those with trust only for the total amount of consensus-
reaching transmissions. We show this for balanced networks in the second graph of
Fig. 11, the same holding true for lazy and sceptic networks: the presence of a distrust
routine has a strong impact on the ability of the network to reach consensus in the pres-
ence of contradictory information, with no more than 9% of runs reaching a full labelling
by either p or ¬p (network of 40 nodes), while in the case of networks with trust only this
value reaches 63% (for networks of the same size).
These experimental results on consensus support empirically the properties of
SecureNDsim derivations provided in “Structural properties on derivations” section,
Lemma 4. To observe this, consider that total networks are graphs in which the number of
edges between nodes is maximal, corresponding to derivations with the maximal number
of branches, one for each pair of agents (vi, vj) appearing respectively in the premises and
in the conclusion. Similarly, overly sceptic networks are graphs corresponding to deriva-
tions wheremore instances of the verify_sceptic rule are used. In both cases, the number of
executions resulting in consensus are maximal, as stated by the first item in Lemma 4. On
the other hand, linear networks are graphs corresponding to derivations where the num-
ber of agents for which the ranking can be transitively established is maximal, and overly
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Fig. 11 Consensus in scale-free networks with distrust
lazy networks are graphs corresponding to derivations where more agents implement the
unverified_lazy rule.
Epistemic costs
The second type of experimental analyses concerns epistemic costs. With this term we
refer to the computational expenses required to perform verification and distrust opera-
tions: these correspond in the calculus to instances of rules verify_high and verify_sceptic
for trust and rules unverified_contra and unverified_lazy for distrust; in the algorithm
they correspond to Verify and Distrust procedures. The effect of these procedures
in the network is to generate trusted and distrusted links respectively. Given that there
are proportionally more nodes than links and a message might pass more than once over
a given node (through several senders), the values for costs are expected to be higher
than those for links. Moreover, given the conditions for Verify are more than those
for Distrust, the values of trust can be expected to be higher than those for distrust.
The aim is to asses these values in the different topologies, to evaluate the proportion
between trust and distrust costs and to use them as parameters to evaluate these actions
with respect to consensus and complexity.
We start by comparing balanced scale-free with random and linear networks with trust
only, see Fig. 12a. The results can be summarised as follows:
Primiero et al. Applied Network Science  (2017) 2:12 Page 21 of 30
Fig. 12 a Comparison of average costs of trust. b Average costs of trust in scale-free networks
• Random networks are by far the most epistemically expensive.
• Linear networks are slightly less expensive than scale-free ones, by a very small
margin. If one is balancing costs against information diffusion, scale-free should
always be preferred to linear networks, as the associated costs do not diverge much
(in general, scale-free networks are more resilient than linear ones).
• Given the previous observation on consensus and time-outs, it is obvious that
random networks are the worse performing ones.
We now compare in more detail average trust costs in scale-free networks in all config-
urations (balanced, overly lazy and overly sceptic). The results are plotted in Fig. 12b. By
definition, a network with a higher number of sceptic nodes and confirmation requests
will have higher trust costs. For small networks up to 40 nodes the costs are within a
small range between 9 and 52; the difference increases significantly between larger overly
lazy and overly sceptic networks. Cost difference remains comparably restricted for bal-
anced and overly lazy networks (with a minimum difference of 15 average points at 50
nodes). This suggests that if one is trying to balance trust costs against consensus, large
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lazy networks should be preferred over balanced ones, as in the latter case the number of
runs with uniform labelling tends to drop, while the costs still increase.
Figure 13 and the associated Table show that the average rate of links and trust costs is
inversely proportional: the former increases from random, through linear, scale-free and
total networks, while the latter decreases. Given the fixed number of sceptic agents across
the various topologies, the decrease in costs should be mainly associated with the ranking
of agents and their order, while the increase in trusted links is purely due to the number
of links in the network. From these data it appears that random networks perform the
worst, as the required costs are high but the obtained links are less than in scale-free or
linear networks.
The different topologies show a similar pattern with respect to distrust values. As shown
in Fig. 14 and the associated Table of average values, random networks are the most
expensive with respect to distrust, and have the lowest number of distrusted links; lin-
ear networks remain constrained in the number of distrusted links, with costs decreasing;
scale-free networks do not show a sensibly better behaviour, with comparable number of
distrusted links and costs; finally, total networks perform the best, with the highest levels
of links and relatively lower costs. As shown in the graph, it is remarkable the diverging
behaviours of total and random networks: the former ones have almost stable distrust
costs with increasing distrusted links, while the latter have stable links with increasing
costs.
The comparison between tables shows that the average number of trusted and dis-
trusted links grows in parallel, while the related costs decrease in a similar vein across
the different topologies. Nonetheless, this proportion is not linear. Trust propagates at a
much higher rate than distrust in these balanced networks, and there is a small differ-
ence between scale-free and linear networks, where the former presents more distrust
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Fig. 13 Trust distribution and average costs
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Fig. 14 Distrust distribution and average costs
than trust cost when compared to the latter. These observations suggest that trust is
a more frequent and more relevant property in information transmission than the lat-
ter in general, and that linear networks are less affected than scale-free ones by distrust
propagation.
Let us briefly compare these experimental results with theoretical properties of
SecureNDsim derivations from “Structural properties on derivations” section. Lemma 2
states that, given a fixed number of sceptic agents in a derivation, the resulting value of
trust instances, defined as epistemic costs, is only due to the applications of the verify_high
rule. The applications of the rule in questionmap directly to the number of order relations
satisfied by agents in the derivation, and hence to the number of agents that are higher in
the order than the agent appearing in the conclusion. Our experimental results show that
this cost value is higher in random networks than in graphs with a linear order, where the
latter correspond to derivations such that ∀vi, vj ∈ V .(vi < vj) ∨ (vi > vj). In the latter
ones, a higher number of transitively valid relation (due to the totality of the graph) means
fewer instances of the verify_high rule are applied. For the case of distrust costs, Lemma 3
states that, given a fixed number of lazy agents, the value of distrust instances is only due
to the applications of the unverified_contra rule. The explanation above, mapping order
relation to topologies, holds in this latter case as well.
Rankings
In this section we offer an analysis of results based on the ranking of the seeding nodes.
We consider the correlation between ranking and consensus in scale-free networks and
investigate:
1. whether a strictly higher ranking for one of the seeding nodes implies a greater
chance to obtain a unanimous graph labelled by the same formula;
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2. which type of scale-free networks (between overly sceptic, balanced and overly
lazy) has the higher probability to reach a unanimous graph from a seed with
higher ranking.
The results of our analysis are plotted in Fig. 15a. This plot reports the proportion of runs
that reach consensus about a label from a higher ranked seed (the RHS axis). Results can
be summarised as follows:
• There is no strict correlation between a highly ranked seed and the labelling of the
network: the number of cases where the consensus is reached and the label is the
same as the one from the higher ranked seed, is relatively small (min 17 , max
8
26 ).
• An overly sceptic scale-free network offers the highest probability to obtain a
unanimous graph labelled with the input of the higher ranked node among the seeds;
the comparison between the lazy and the balanced network sees the former obtain
better results in general, and the latter only for significantly large networks.
Fig. 15 a Higher ranked seeds in consensus reaching network. b costs and ranking
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The next data analysis concerns the correlation of ranking of the seeds with costs: is
information transmission from equally ranked seeds more or less expensive than trans-
mission from differently ranked ones? The results for overly lazy, balanced and overly
sceptic scale-free networks are plotted in Fig. 15b. The results can be summarised as
follows:
• Contradictory information transmission from differently ranked nodes tends to be
more expensive than from equally ranked nodes in balanced and overly lazy
networks: here the costs are induced by a less stable labelling for the information
transmitted by higher ranked nodes.
• In lazy networks, the higher costs of differently ranked seeds tend to collapse for
maximally large networks, where the costs are less than the corresponding seeding
with equally ranked nodes.
• Contradictory information transmission from equally ranked nodes tends to be more
expensive than from differently ranked nodes in overly sceptic networks: this can be a
symptom of the greater overall epistemic balance of the sources spreading
information, combined with the more common attitude of agents to require
confirmation.
Distrust and epistemic attitude
In this and the following experiments, we focus on scale-free networks only and their
distrust behaviour. First, we consider distrust as a parameter of the proportion of lazy
agents in a network of 300 nodes, with a random assignment of labels to seeding agents
(lazy/sceptic). As shown in Fig. 16, there is a strict correlation between the proportion of
sceptic and the distrust behaviour: the more lazy agents are present in the network, the
higher its overall distrust value. While this is obvious in view of the algorithm design, it is
interesting to remark that in the case of a fully sceptic network (where no lazy agents are
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Fig. 16 Distrust behaviour and epistemic attitude
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allowed), the value of distrust is to be associated entirely with the presence of contradic-
tory information, and hence it can be used as a parameter of contradiction diffusion. The
associated Table offers average values over 100 runs. It illustrates that conflict resolution
is responsible on average for roughly 10% of the network’s distrusted edges, with costs
averaging at around 17 of those of a highly lazy network (i.e., with 10% of sceptic agents).
We now extract the values for a balanced network (i.e., with 50% of sceptic agents)
and compare them to the initial distribution of seeds qualified as lazy-sceptic agents. As
Fig. 17 shows, there is a strict correlation of the final distribution of distrust values with
the initial condition of the network: the range of minimal values for both distrust costs
and number of distrusted links is relatively stable, while their maximum value decreases
when moving from a configuration that has two sceptic agents as initial nodes to one that
has two lazy ones. The result on distrust across the network is less influenced by the role
of agents distributing the information than by the role of agents receiving it.
Time complexity
The final analysis concerns the time complexity of our algorithm. Its running time effi-
ciency is computed as a function relating the size of the network (in terms of the number
of nodes) with the number of steps required for termination. Recall that each step in the
simulation expresses one message transmission or epistemic operation of verification or
distrust. We wish to know whether and in which way the network topology affects this
relation.
Obviously, time complexity of an overly lazy scale-free network will be lower than that
of a balanced one, as a result of the lower number of confirmation steps that are required
to fully label the graph. Correspondingly, time complexity of an overly sceptic network
will be higher, as a result of the higher number of confirmation steps required to fully
label the graph. Instead, we concentrate on the values of a balanced scale-free network
and compare them against linear, random and total networks. We include additional data
points (every 10 nodes between 10 and 300) in order to increase precision, see Fig. 18a.
For the random network, in view of the time-out conditions mentioned in “Consensus”
section, the graph only reports the values for the terminating runs. The results can be
summarised as follows:
• Linear networks are the most computationally expensive in terms of time it takes for
the procedure to terminate.
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Fig. 18 a Time Complexity. b Best fit comparisons
• Scale-free are at most as expensive as random ones.
• Total networks have a linear increase of the computational complexity in the number
of nodes and require the shortest time to terminate.
The difference between total networks (the cheapest one) and linear networks (the most
expensive one) is over 150 steps. The algorithm has complexityO(n), see Fig. 18b for best
fit of a linear function to the data for scale-free and random networks.
Conclusions
We have offered an agent-based modelling of contradictory information transmission
across a network. Agents are heterogeneously qualified as either sceptic or lazy, and they
are ranked. This model simulates some typical real case scenarios, like those of social net-
works or (role-based) access control systems. We consider in particular networks with
memory, where the result of a given transmission in terms of trusted edges is preserved
at the next transmission and the new labelling can therefore be compared. Our algorithm
associates costs to confirmation processes. We identify trust as a property of communi-
cations (rather than as a relation), when such confirmation is performed. We focus on
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contradiction resolution by a trustworthiness metric, computed by the popularity of the
information in the reachable network and the ranking of the associated node. We further
compare this resolution strategy with a another metric based on distrust, where the least
trusted content is rejected.
Our results suggest that a sceptic approach is favourable when maximisation of consen-
sus is the goal; a lazy approach should be pursued when minimisation of costs is the goal.
We have also suggested that ranking of initial nodes is only of little relevance to consensus
reaching, while a rigidly structured network (linear) is the most expensive in this respect.
Finally, in the comparison between trust and distrust, it clearly results that the former is
a better mean to information propagation than the latter. Moreover, we have highlighted
how the presence of contradictory information is by itself the cause of distrust generation,
independently from the initial attitude of the agents.
While the simulatedmodel allows for change of such attitude, by determining confirma-
tion and rejection rates of sceptic and lazy agents, in future extensions, we plan to allow
agents to reject information explicitly and in turn allow re-labelling. This could imply a
one-time refutation on the transmission channel or a permanent one in networks with
memory. The effects of such operations on the various types of networks is unknown
and would offer an important opening in the analysis of negative concepts for compu-
tational trust in multi-agent systems. The dynamic of agents can be further extended by
allowing change of their epistemic status (sceptic vs. lazy) after a sufficient number of
(un)successful interactions (i.e., not by some pre-fixed rate).
The present analysis also misses a finer-grained analysis of structural conditions under
which certain results (e.g. higher epistemic costs and consensus) are obtained. A more
systematic analysis would allow to prune isomorphic networks (e.g. in view of the initial
edge structure and ranking). Currently, applications of an extension of this model are
being explored in the context of swarm robotics, see for example (Paudel and Clark 2016).
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